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Abstract
Shifts in governance can be conceived of as a response to policy capacities 
being shared—in a material sense—between centralized and decentralized 
levels of government. A comparative case study is conducted of three concep-
tually different shifts in governance. Unclear responsibility relations lead to 
“paradoxes of decentralization,” in which the applied mode of governance 
blocks the intended improvements. Three case studies are presented to illus-
trate these mechanisms. There is no “best” way of decentralizing responsibili-
ties; requirements of governance modes are ambiguous. The sharing of policy 
capacities between central and decentralized levels of governance requires 
internally inconsistent governance arrangements.
Keywords
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Shifts in governance comprise the rational reorganization of government in 
response to new social and economic pressures, and institutionalizes specific 
values and beliefs concerning the role of centralized and decentralized state 
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and nonstate actors. Robinson (2008) outlined two differing state responses 
to decreasing state capacities and two differing ways of understanding these. 
The first one is called the “command-hierarchy” approach and the second one 
is the “influence-network” model. The first approach locates competencies in 
the central state and discusses how states shift responsibilities to other actors 
in response to decreasing state capacity. Relations are reshuffled to uphold a 
centralized concept of state responsibility. Robinson contrasts this to a network 
approach in which not state responsibility but instead “the quality of outcomes” 
is “the principal determinant of accountability” (p. 568).
The “sovereignties in transition” debate (Walker, 2003) addresses the same 
issue of government capacities under decreasing sovereignty. Osiander (2001) 
argued that the decentralization of regulatory competencies entails a funda-
mental contestation of state sovereignty, unmasking sovereignty as “Westphalian 
Myth.” However, Durant (2000) argued instead that shifts in governance entail 
the emergence of a “neo-administrative state” assuming increased central 
responsibilities, albeit in a “masked” fashion (p. 80). Durant builds on Clarke 
and Newman’s (1997) Managerial State. In the neoadministrative state, 
authority is diffused from the public to civic and market spheres and, as Clarke 
and Newman argued, “Far from being shifts towards a ‘rolling back’ of the 
state, these changes involve a ‘rolling out’ of state power but in new, dispersed, 
forms” (p. 30, cited in Durant, 2000, p. 80).
We link this debate to the literature on new modes of governance and 
decentralization. We seek to make a contribution to these debates in two 
ways. In the first place, we aim at a model of transition modes. Can different 
forms of sovereignty in transition be systematically ordered as modes of gov-
ernance? We conceptualize sovereignty transitions as operations in which 
relations between centralized and decentralized levels of government are 
restructured. Although sovereignty transitions may go both ways, we discuss 
three cases of decentralization. However, not different from centralization, 
decentralization produces a constellation of governance responsibilities. The 
emphasis of our study, accordingly, is not on the direction of change but on 
the resulting mode of governance.
In the second place, we attempt to explain the performance of these modes, 
particularly with respect to “administrative responsibility.” The governance 
concept concerns two things: the relative capacity of alternative constella-
tions of government to perform specific policy functions and the normative 
quality or appropriateness of their roles. We refrain from the primarily nor-
mative approach that is often used in political science and law (Van Kersbergen 
& Van Waarden, 2004). We do not evaluate the normative quality, legitimacy, 
or legal nature of various governance constellations. Instead, we engage a 
positive-evaluative approach, illustrating how new modes of governance differ 
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with respect to the nature of administrative responsibility that they support. 
Our central research question concerns the following issue: How do modes of 
governance support administrative responsibility?
“Complete decentralization” is aimed at decentralized responsibility as 
“virtue” or a full transition from sovereignty to “subsidiarity.” However, such 
subsidiary responsibility may well appear to come down to the transition of 
central-level conflict to the decentralized level if supralocal interdependen-
cies are not sufficiently addressed: the paradox of subsidiarity. Two conceptu-
ally different modes of “incomplete decentralization” address these problems 
of subsidiarity but may create unclear responsibility relations. The decentral-
ization of policy autonomy (“decentralized task responsibility”) is aimed at 
the increased utilization of local information, but it may lead to overemphasiz-
ing local issues at the cost of central-level concerns: the self-regulation para-
dox. The decentralization of the risks of policy failure and success (“decentralized 
accountability”) is aimed at stimulating local efforts toward the attainment of 
central-level policy aims. However, it may lead to a rather mechanistic response 
to incentives and the underutilization of local expertise and information: the 
performance paradox.
In the next section, we argue that shifts in governance take place in response 
to policy capacities partially existing at the central and partially at the decen-
tralized level of governance systems. In the second section, we discuss three 
empirical cases of decentralization, each representing one of the analytical 
categories of decentralization. These are based on our own research in the con-
text of the Dutch welfare state. We discuss these cases to illustrate how decen-
tralization operations support specific types of administrative responsibility 
while evoking decentralization paradoxes. In the final section, we shortly dis-
cuss decentralization in other contexts and formulate a conclusion on decen-
tralization and responsibility. We consider to what extent a centralized 
conception of state capacity is upheld, as Robinson (2008), Durant (2000), 
and Clarke and Newman (1997) suggested. However, we aim at stretching 
beyond this discussion somewhat arguing that it is not (only) the extent of 
power but also the content of power that differs between types of decentral-
ization processes. Instead of discussing how much centralized and decentral-
ized results from varying sovereignty transitions and their resulting modes of 
governance, we discuss what types of administrative responsibility relations 
are supported.
Decentralization and Responsibility
“Sovereignty in transition” evokes shifts in governance that can be considered 
partial decentralization operations. Partial decentralization complicates the 
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pursuit of responsibility. Below, four analytically different modes of governance 
can be distinguished, stretching from completely centralized to two modes 
of partially decentralized to completely decentralized governance constella-
tions. We discuss the responsibility constellations that are supported by these 
modes.
Shifts in Governance as Partial Decentralization
“New” governance arrangements are characterized by processes of coordina-
tion without full central authority (see Van Kersbergen & Van Waarden, 2004, 
p. 152). In the public sphere, a shift in governance is observed in which 
traditional, hierarchical governance mechanisms are being replaced by 
horizontal, interactive, or multilevel arrangements. The idea of a shift 
toward “new” modes assumes a “traditional” mode of governance that the cur-
rent mode has shifted away from. This traditional mode, often indicated as 
“government,” is one specific mode of governance. It is characterized by 
coordination, by “hierarchical imposition” (Héritier, 2002), and by national, 
democratically legitimated institutions, possibly mandating competencies to 
lower levels of government. This hierarchical mode of governance is cur-
rently being replaced by other modes that differ with respect to their location, 
mechanisms, and styles (Héritier, 2002; Knill & Lenschow, 2003; Scharpf, 
2001; Van Kersbergen & Van Waarden, 2004).
New governance constellations emerge in response to a constellation of 
interdependencies in which the capacity of a central, coordinating entity is 
incomplete and power is shared—in the material sense of the word—between 
levels of coordination. Knill and Lehmkuhl (2002) discussed European mul-
tilevel governance arrangements and argued that centralized coordination is 
required because mutual interdependencies between decentralized actors 
exist. This is an important motivation, for example, European social policy 
integration that addresses problems related to coordination of national wel-
fare states and labor markets. However, the same literature on European 
Union (EU) integration amply shows that national preferences and institu-
tionalized welfare state and labor market arrangements stand in the way of 
further social policy integration (Citi & Rhodes, 2007; De la Porte, Pochet, & 
Room, 2001; Falkner, 1998; Ferrera, Matsanganis, & Sacchi, 2002; Jacobsson, 
2004). Interdependencies between European states engender pressures toward 
policy coordination and convergence. However, at the same time, the com-
parative advantages of national economies (Hall & Soskice, 2001) form an 
incentive to protect policy autonomy and divergence. That is, the low social 
cost advantage of new European member states invokes pressures from high 
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social cost states to harmonize wages and social security systems while it 
invokes efforts to protect the own market from such pressures. Such para-
doxical relation between the interunit and intraunit level exists independent 
from the existence of explicit supraunit coordination projects like the path 
toward the single European market. What is more, supraunit interdependen-
cies often function as the impetus to increased coordination, although they 
recurrently invoke opposition against these same efforts (De Swaan, 1988). 
Interdependencies between employers in the late 19th and early 20th century 
have led various employer groups to strive for the introduction of state coor-
dinated welfare arrangements; there were also employer groups who opposed 
against coordination in the Netherlands (De Vries, 1970; Schwitters, 1991) 
and in other states, like the United States (Berkowitz & McQuaid, 1980). 
Concurrent and recurrent pressures toward central coordination and decentral-
ized autonomy have determined the history of the Dutch welfare state (Bannink, 
Kuipers, & Lantink, 2006; Bieber & Bannink, 2005; Cox, 1993).
For both downward and upward shifts in governance, it goes that the locus 
of governing capacity is partially situated at the central level of entities 
engaged in the coordination of action and partially at the decentralized level 
of entities whose action is being coordinated. Both shifts appear to take place 
at the same time and in response to similar pressures (Mayntz, 1993). 
Central governments lose power to decentralized actors because of the com-
plexity of local conditions, although interdependencies between decentral-
ized actors require upward shifts in governance. Shifts in governance are 
conceptualized as decentralization operations responding to capacities in a 
material sense being shared between the central and decentralized levels of 
a governance constellation.
The partiality of central governmental capacities proves to be highly prob-
lematic for the conceptualization of sovereignty. Sovereignty can, under such 
conditions, no longer be fully justified.
Decentralization and Sovereignty
The distinguishing mark of sovereignty is “the autonomy of the political” 
(Loughlin, 2003, p. 56). But with the rise of governance actors, the state is 
no longer constitutionally independent from other communities. With current 
challenges posed by globalization and the related interdependencies between 
sovereign states and by localization and the dependency from localized units, 
sovereignty becomes “organized hypocrisy” (Krasner, 1999).
In the sovereignties in transition debate, it is therefore widely argued that 
the rise of governance structures makes sovereignty an outdated principle. 
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The sovereign state changes into a “post-Westphalian state” (Falk, 2002) or 
“responsible state” (Etzioni, 2006). Such a sovereign state no longer functions 
to guarantee legal security but is responsible for the whole of humankind, 
organizing the legalization and enforcement of human rights (Cohen, 2004; 
Levy & Sznaider, 2006). Carozza (2003) fully abandoned sovereignty and 
introduced “subsidiarity” as a more fitting political form in an era of 
“glocalization.” Subsidiarity implies that no higher authority can legitimately 
act if a lower authority is able to and that a higher authority can intervene in 
the affairs of lower authorities only if this enables them to govern themselves 
(Ossewaarde, 2007b). The central state under subsidiarity is a derivative of 
local authority, deriving its legitimacy from the belief that lower, typically 
local or regional communities lack the capacities that they need to flourish, 
although higher authorities, such as the EU, United Nations, Roman Catholic 
Church, or the state, can provide these.
Sovereignty is in transition because sovereign government presupposes 
the existence of monopoly power and policy-making capacity—not only in 
the legal arrangement but also in the material content of the constellation. It 
is this capacity that is limited to an increasing extent. Policy capacity is 
increasingly shared between the central and decentralized level. This implies 
that the responsibility for policy formation and implementation is shared 
accordingly. In the next section, we outline four aspects of administrative 
responsibility that we, in the subsequent section, link to four governance con-
stellations, indicating conceptually different sovereignty transitions.
Administrative Responsibility
Bovens (1998) made a distinction between four different types of responsibility. 
In the first place, responsibility may refer to “capacity.” Actors’ responsibility 
follows from their alleged capacity to carry their duties, in the sense of 
position and available means. In terms of capacity, responsibility refers to 
holding sovereign power to effectuate the policy objectives of the sovereign 
state. Sovereignty in transition implies that capacity is no longer sufficiently 
available at the level of central government. Responsibilities are decentral-
ized within the state and a “new social contract” is drawn (Ossewaarde, 2007a). 
Capacity is shared between the central and decentralized levels of gover-
nance systems.
Capacity is shared in the second responsibility type: responsibility as 
“accountability.” This responsibility refers to regulated actors being held 
responsible for the consequences of the choices that they make within the 
sovereign state. Accountability is primarily an economic type of responsibility, 
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which is carried within the institutional context of market capitalism and 
“freedom of choice.” In this responsibility type, a market relation is constructed 
between a central, regulating government and decentralized, regulated imple-
menting agencies or local governments. Regulated actors are considered free 
agents, responsible for the outcomes of their own, free choices. These organi-
zations are treated as service providers. Central government, acting as service 
purchaser, introduces incentives to influence the free choice of service pro-
viders. Citizens are defined as “consumer-citizens,” who consume public ser-
vices and construct their civic identities through their consumptions (Bevir & 
Trentmann, 2007).
A third responsibility type, in which capacity is also shared, is the delegation 
of responsibility as “task.” This responsibility refers to the duties or obliga-
tions that are attached to the autonomy and competencies that subjects are 
considered to have. The task of central government is primarily understood in 
terms of supporting or enforcing the role obligations of decentralized target 
groups. Decentralized actors have a duty or are obliged to provide services at 
adequate standards. If decentralized levels of a governance system fail to 
fulfill their tasks appropriately, then the sovereign denies them the legal right 
to act as implementing agency or local government. This threat allows central 
government to influence decentralized agencies.
The fourth mode comprises the full transfer of policy capacity to the decen-
tralized level. In this case, responsibility as “virtue” is pursued. This type of 
responsibility is not exercised within the sovereign state. Instead, it is gov-
erned by the subsidiarity principle. Regulated actors are considered to have 
personal qualities that induce them to act responsibly. In the subsidiary state, 
central government is not a sovereign power but a higher authority that is 
responsible for assisting decentralized actors in support of their self-government. 
Self-government is an end in itself, not a means or policy instrument to effec-
tuate central government’s objectives. A key function of subsidiary government 
is to sustain decentralized authority and safeguard pluralism and diversity.
In the sovereign state, decentralization implies the delegation of central-
ized power to lower levels of sovereign power. This power shift takes place 
within the government, which implies that the sovereign keeps its power but 
transfers responsibilities to enhance its efficacy. This indicates the emergence 
of a “neoadministrative state” (Durant, 2000), a state that shows a traditional 
pursuit of social control by new means. Sovereignty, also decentralized, regu-
lates the relations between citizens, social organizations, and decentralized 
public agencies and mitigates the effects of social conflict.
The redistribution of responsibility typified as virtue signals the radical 
transformation from the sovereign state into the subsidiary state. It implies 
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localization. Subsidiary states are political entities in themselves that enable 
their citizens to acquire (civic) virtue and thereby govern themselves. As sub-
sidiary states offer no legal protection, but count on the potential virtue of 
citizens, self-government is a potentially dangerous affair, in the sense that it 
may prove unable to mitigate the potentially conflictual relationships between 
social actors.
These different responsibility types are pursued by different modes of 
decentralization. These modes may evoke specific paradoxical effects.
The Pursuit of Responsibility and 
the Paradoxes of Decentralization
Decentralization occurs under the acknowledgment of interdependencies 
between central and decentralized actors; that is, the locus of capacity is 
partially situated at the decentralized and partially at the centralized level. 
Next to a fully centralized mode, three modes of decentralization can be 
conceived. A policy is comprised of (a) substantial content of the policy and 
(b) the resources needed for policy implementation (Hoogerwerf, 2003, 
p. 20). Decentralization may concern (a) the transferal of policy content, that 
is, the transferal of policy-making autonomy and implementation discretion 
from central to geographically or functionally decentralized levels of admin-
istration; (b) the transferal of policy resources, the financial and other risks 
of policy failure and success, from the central to decentralized levels of 
administration; or (c) the transferal of both substantial and resource compe-
tencies. In a fully centralized constellation, substance and resources are situated 
at the central level.
The transferal of only policy-making autonomy and implementation dis-
cretion is aimed at supporting the decentralized actor fulfilling his centrally 
defined role obligations. Resource risks remain at the central level, whereas 
decentralized actors are allowed to substantiate their role obligations in the 
concrete local context. Responsibility as task is pursued. If only the resource 
risks of policy failure and success are transferred to the decentralized level, 
responsibility as accountability is in order. Local government becomes respon-
sible for the attainment of specified policy goals that are formulated elsewhere, 
at higher hierarchical levels. This responsibility is supported by influencing the 
choice options of decentralized units. The transferal of both resource risks 
and policy-making autonomy to the decentralized level is aimed at responsi-
bility as virtue. In this responsibility mode, central-level capacities essen-
tially become irrelevant. A subsidiary constellation is pursued.
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The first two are “incomplete” modes of decentralization. Decentralized 
levels of a governance system support central sovereignty, albeit “in transition.” 
We call the third, subsidiary variant “complete” decentralization. The decen-
tralization of neither policy content nor resources produces a “nontransition” 
sovereignty constellation where capacity is considered completely located at 
the central level.
When an agency is given implementation discretion, although a specified 
output component of this agency is measured and rewarded, accountability is 
pursued. Such incomplete decentralization mode may lead to unintended 
effects. A so-called “performance paradox”—a seeming contradiction—may 
occur (Van Thiel & Leeuw, 2002). The establishment of a specified perfor-
mance indicator supports increased control over decentralized performance. 
The same increased specification of the indicator, however, enables the 
decentralized actor to concentrate his efforts on a more limited policy goal, 
circumscribed by the rewarded aspects of performance while ignoring the 
nonmeasured aspects of performance (Van Thiel & Leeuw, 2002). The policy 
goal that is implied in the performance indicator “overrules” decentralized 
implementation discretion. Rewarded performance increases, whereas actual 
performance, circumscribed by the aims of the policy at large, may deterio-
rate. Coming up to measured performance criteria, the decentralized actor 
influences the substantial content of the policy as it is implemented at “street 
level” (Lipsky, 1980). “Creaming,” prioritizing the easier cases from a casel-
oad to increase the number of successfully finished cases, is an example. 
Actual implementation contains a different client selection criterion than the 
originally formulated policy.
This particular mode of decentralization often occurs in New Public 
Management (NPM) arrangements. NPM arrangements are characterized by 
a more distanced relationship between (centralized) policy-making authorities 
and (decentralized) policy-implementation authorities. This goes along with 
a separation of policy formulation and performance assessment functions on 
one hand and policy implementation on the other hand: Osborne and Gaebler’s 
(1992) “Steering Rather Than Rowing.”
Another paradox, the “paradox of self-regulation,” often occurs in corpo-
ratist policy implementation constellations (Bannink, 2004; Schmitter, 1974) 
and in many other instances in which a central governing actor seeks the 
cooperation and consent of actors in the field. Central governments may seek 
decentralized involvement in policy formulation to increase the support for a 
policy. For example, in the context of European social policy making, the 
Open Method of Coordination is considered as an instrument the European 
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Commission uses to involve EU member states that cannot be controlled 
through hierarchical regulation (Jacobsson, 2004; O’Connor, 2005). Furthermore, 
because decentralized actors command relevant information about important 
issues at the decentralized level, the efficacy of policy implementation may 
be improved. Decentralized actors are given a role in both “steering” and 
“rowing.” This implements responsibility as task. Collective funds are made 
available to finance policy aims that are formulated in a constellation in 
which central actors share regulatory power with decentralized actors. 
Decentralized actors apply these means to implement the policy. Héritier and 
Eckert (2008) argued that self-regulation is often implemented under “weak 
control.” Weak control leads to gaps in the implementation of policy propos-
als: Instead of providing increased decentralized information and policy sup-
port, decentralized actors may show rent-seeking behavior (Olson, 1971) 
and apply the available funds to strengthen their own organizational capacity 
(Bannink, 2004; Moe, 2005). This signifies a paradox. Deregulation was 
intended to increase the policy-making and implementation capacity of a 
central actor only capable of weak control. Improved capacity is pursued by 
giving decentralized actors a role in the policy process, implying responsibil-
ity as task. Instead, the same self-regulation under weak control might 
empower decentralized actors, ultimately allowing them to give priority to 
decentralized interests.
Incomplete decentralization may give rise to paradoxes. A performance 
paradox may occur where centralized control is too strong (not leading to 
increased performance but to an instrumental emphasis on rewarded perfor-
mance); a self-regulation paradox may occur where centralized control is too 
weak (not leading to increased decentralized information and support but to 
uncontrollable policy costs).
Complete decentralization might address problems related to the perfor-
mance paradox and the paradox of self-regulation. Decentralized actors can 
neither pursue decentralized interests funded by centrally provided means 
nor adjust their policies to centrally rewarded policy aims. Complete decen-
tralization implies transferring policy autonomy and implementation discre-
tion as well as the financial risk of policy failure and success, supporting 
responsibility as virtue. A subsidiary constellation emerges. However, a com-
plete mode of decentralization is not necessarily adequate. Are policy objec-
tives indeed most feasibly addressed at the local level or are supralocal and 
intralocal interdependencies included in the issue that need to be addressed at 
the centralized level? A subsidiarity paradox may occur: not virtue is attained, 
but the transfer of central-level policy conflicts to the decentralized level.
Bannink and Ossewaarde 11
Skocpol (1995; see also Huber & Shipan, 2002) identified such a paradox 
with respect to the decentralization of public assistance in the United States. 
The budgets of public assistance were transferred from the federal state to the 
local level, and decentralized actors were given policy-formulation auton-
omy. However, without taking into account the extent of necessary means, a 
specific policy objective—of social policy retrenchment in this case—was 
imposed on decentralized actors. As a result, decentralized actors were trans-
formed into instruments for the attainment of federal retrenchment objectives. 
It became difficult for the decentralized actor to formulate a policy that addressed 
specific, complex local conditions and policy preferences.
Previously, we discussed the sovereignty in transition debate and related 
that to modes of decentralization. “Sovereignty in transition” results from par-
tial capacities at the central level of a governance system, leading to problems 
of policy formation and implementation. Three possible modes of decentral-
ization were distinguished (see Figure 1). Either policy content (a) or policy 
resources (b) or both (c) can be decentralized. These modes support specific 
types of administrative responsibility but may each evoke specific paradoxes 
of decentralization. The transfer of the financial risks of policy failure and suc-
cess supports decentralized responsibility as accountability. However, it may 









































Figure 1. Responsibility outcomes of three decentralization modes
12  Administration & Society XX(X)
the policy aims of the central actor, preventing them to apply relevant local 
information. The transfer of policy-making autonomy might instead of sup-
porting decentralized responsibility as task and decentralized involvement in 
central-level policy issues lead to decentralized action being oriented to 
the concerns of decentralized actors. The transfer of both risks and policy 
autonomy to the central level might instead of supporting decentralized 
responsibility as virtue lead to the transfer of central-level conflict to the 
decentralized level.
In the following section, we present three empirical cases of social policy 
decentralization—one for each of the decentralization modes—and illus-
trate how decentralization supports administrative responsibility and evokes 
decentralization paradoxes.
Three Cases of Decentralization
In this section, we discuss three recent decentralization processes that differ 
with respect to their modes of decentralization. In the first case, the financial 
risk of policy failure and success was transferred to the decentralized level, 
whereas policy-making autonomy and implementation discretion was not. 
Responsibility as accountability was pursued. However, a performance para-
dox was evoked. In the second case, policy content was transferred to the 
decentralized level, whereas policy resources were not. Responsibility as task 
was pursued and a self-regulation paradox occurred. In the third case, policy 
content and policy resources were decentralized. This supported responsibil-
ity as virtue, but it also gave rise to a subsidiarity paradox in which central 
conflict was transferred to the decentralized level.
This article is a reassessment of primary research conducted with various 
other researchers and previously published in a number of research reports. 
The context of the case studies is the Dutch welfare state. This entails that our 
results might be affected by the particular context the studied decentralization 
modes are situated in. The Dutch welfare state is exceptional because it is 
characterized by highly institutionalized relationships between state and civil 
society organizations and a strong history of tripartite involvement in policy 
formation and implementation (Bannink & Hoogenboom, 2007; Trommel & 
Van der Veen, 1999; Van Doorn & Schuyt, 1978). In other words, “incomplete 
decentralization” is a normal mode of governance in the Dutch context. In the 
conclusion to this article, we make a limited comparative analysis of two other 
welfare states, France and the United States, with strongly different gover-
nance traditions.
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For each of the three Dutch cases, we first outline the decentralization 
constellation and relate this to the framework of decentralization discussed 
above: Which components of decentralization have actually been proposed 
and implemented? After that, we assess the achieved mode of administrative 
responsibility and its consequences.
Work and Social Assistance Act (WWB)
In 2004, the WWB was introduced to replace the Social Assistance Act of 1996. 
The Act pursued a new substantial policy objective indicated as “Prioritisation 
of Work Above Income” (TK 28870, No. 3, 2002-2003, pp. 2-4); the “rules 
of the act have to activate the responsibilities and capacities of citizens and 
local governments as much as possible” (TK 28870, No. 3, 2002-2003, p. 2). 
To do so, the obligations and incentives of citizens and local government are 
intensified (TK 28870, No. 3, 2002-2003).
The new policy objective is to be attained through a changed administra-
tive organization of policy implementation, characterized by “three Ds”: 
decentralization, deregulation, and the decrease of reporting obligations. The 
“decentralization” of financial responsibilities (TK 28870, No. 3, 2002-2003, 
p. 15 ff.) was introduced as an incentive to local governments aimed at client 
activation. Local governments can no longer claim the expenses of benefit 
provision from the national budget. Instead, this so-called “income-component” 
of the social assistance budget was integrated in the general municipal bud-
get. This entails that local governments bear the risk of policy failure and 
success: An increase of the number of beneficiaries directly affects the local 
budget. Expenses of beneficiary reintegration activities, the “work-component,” 
were not integrated in the local budgets. Local governments can claim expenses 
made for client reintegration from a separate, national fund. “Deregulation” of 
social assistance provision granted local governments the competency to estab-
lish decrees in which benefit provision and client reintegration activities are 
further specified (TK 28870, No. 3, 2002-2003, p. 40 ff.). The decrease of 
reporting obligations formed an additional operation to increase administra-
tive efficiency (TK 28870, No. 3, 2002-2003).
The act included additional, secondary regulations to mitigate the expected 
effects of the act (Bosselaar, Bannink, van Deursen, & Trommel, 2007). 
Required was that municipal decrees be of a “balanced” nature so as to 
include different client groups (TK 28870, No. 3, 2002-2003, p. 40) and that 
the income guarantee remain in place (TK 28870, No. 3, 2002-2003). 
Collective exemptions of work obligations were forbidden.
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Central government considered that the decentralization of the financial 
risk of policy failure and success would contribute to the attainment of the 
new primary policy objective of “work before income.” This mode of decen-
tralization supports administrative responsibility as accountability. The 
incentive of the decentralized income-component appeared to unequivocally 
stimulate local governments to focus their efforts on immediate client reinte-
gration. The governance concept of the act therefore can be characterized as 
“governance by performance management,” implying “strict regulation” 
(Bosselaar et al., 2007, p. 111). A performance paradox occurred. The incen-
tive of the act overrules possible local considerations concerning work and 
social assistance that do not lead to immediate client reintegration. More 
complex individual cases and more complex local conditions are pushed out 
of the range of policy options that local governments can cover. For example, 
the WWB has made it more difficult for local governments to support inten-
sive reintegration activities for clients who have a greater distance to labor 
participation or the nonlabor social integration of citizens. Creaming of clients 
seems to occur (Bosselaar et al., 2007; Van Ours, 2007). However, although 
various actors in the field initially argue that such creaming may be temporary, 
the incentive system of the act appears to reinforce creaming in economically 
difficult conditions. Divosa, the association of directors of municipal social 
service agencies, argued in the 2009 publication of their yearly “WWB 
Monitor” that social services initially centered attention on the easily reinte-
grated clients, although later on the effort was broadened to also include the 
more difficult groups (Divosa, 2009, p. 29). This picture is supported by 
quantitative research that shows that the number of beneficiaries from more 
difficult groups (clients aged above 45 years and clients who have received 
benefits for more than 2 years) declines (Bosselaar et al., 2007). In 2010, 
when the economic crisis that started in 2008 hit the social services, Divosa 
argued, however, that
the financial incentive in the Work and Social Assistance Act causes 
municipalities to primarily aim at the “quick fix.” The money firstly 
goes to people who can be re-integrated into labour by means of limited 
and not too expensive instruments. (Divosa, 2010, p. 11)
Possibly as a result of the quick reintegration of the easier client groups, 
the reintegration into labor as a percentage of the total number of clients 
decreased continuously between 2006 (16.2%) and 2009 (11.4%; SGBO, 
2009). Between 2006 and 2008, the percentage of clients who received 
benefits for more than 5 years has increased from 37.4% to 41.4%, to 
Bannink and Ossewaarde 15
decrease in 2009 to 40.5% primarily as a result of increased new intakes 
(SGBO, 2009). Although we feel that we need to emphasize that the interpre-
tation of such quantitative figures is extremely problematic, we deem the 
social integration of citizens with a greater distance to labor less supported by 
the new WWB than under the previous regulation.
Although the strong emphasis on more easily reintegrated clients actually 
conforms to the intentions of the policy maker, the WWB is not exclusively 
aimed at the reintegration of these groups. “Social activation,” a “balanced 
implementation of the act” including varying targets groups, and the “prevention” 
of benefit dependency are among the aims and objectives of the act (Bosselaar 
et al., 2007, pp. 30-31; TK 28870, No. 3, 2002-2003). This implies that the 
local emphasis on immediate reintegration can indeed be considered an 
instance of a performance paradox: The required performance was broader 
than the produced performance.
Unemployment and nonparticipation in labor and society have strong 
local aspects. The national state has indeed transferred financial risks to the 
decentralized level. The local responsibility type that the governance relation 
of the WWB pursues can therefore best be characterized as responsibility as 
accountability. Direct central regulation has been exchanged for incentives 
to stimulate local governments to fulfill the policy objectives of the national 
sovereign. However, the introduced incentive appeared to restrict local policy 
autonomy and implementation discretion, and orient local policy implemen-
tation to a specific, nationally inspired policy objective of immediate client 
reintegration. Instead of responsibility as accountability, a performance par-
adox occurs. Local governments come up to the rewarded aspects of perfor-
mance and downplay other aspects. This leads to increased reintegration 
efforts for the more easily treated clients but deteriorated access for more 
difficult cases. The costs of the policy arrangement are transferred downward 
to vulnerable client groups who face the danger of social exclusion.
Health and Safety Covenants
The Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment established the policy program 
of health and safety covenants in 1999 (TK 26375, No. 1, 1998-1999). The 
program was inspired by the Health and Safety Act of 1998, in which the own 
responsibility for health and safety of employers and employees was enlarged. 
The health and safety covenants changed the coordination and governance of 
health and safety conditions by central-level rules and regulations controlled 
by the public Labor Inspection into decentralized development and imple-
mentation of health and safety measures (Veerman et al., 2007).
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Health and safety covenants are tripartite agreements (labor unions, employers, 
and national government) on labor conditions and health and safety measures 
in a specific branch of industry. The covenant approach acknowledged that 
such targets could not be laid down in legal regulation but instead required 
branch-level input in both the definition of targets and the implementation of 
the required measures. Therefore, decentralized involvement in policy forma-
tion and implementation was pursued, supporting responsibility as task.
So-called branch-level advice committees supported the covenant decision 
and implementation process. These committees consisted of representatives 
from the ministry of Social Affairs, of labor and employers’ organizations in 
the branch and of the public Labor Inspection. The latter organization is 
responsible for supervision over health and safety conditions at work and as 
such has a role in the traditional regulation of the health and safety issue. The 
Labor Inspection eventually withdrew from the committee. It took a distanced 
position because it did not want to stand in the way of decentralized input in 
decision making and implementation (Veerman et al., 2007).
Financial resources were made available for the policy-making and imple-
mentation process in the various branches. The costs of the design and imple-
mentation of health and safety measures could be claimed at a level of 50% 
of total costs. The number of participating branches exceeded expectation. 
A total of 67 instead of the expected 20 branches participated, although more 
than half of the total number of Dutch employees was eventually covered by 
one of the covenants (Veerman et al., 2007). However, although the number 
of participating branches was relatively large, the actual success of most of 
the covenants was limited at best. The phase of discussing health and safety 
issues in the branch and the design of measures took longer than expected 
and showed relatively high levels of conflict. Often, partners were brought 
together who had only limited contact before, for example, only in the case of 
collective labor agreement negotiations. This may be explained by the finan-
cial means that could be claimed (Veerman et al., 2007). It stimulated actors 
to participate in the process that would not cooperate with each other without 
these additional funds (Veerman et al., 2007).
This had repercussions in the implementation phase. Although the number 
of actually closed covenants was greater than expected, actual implementation 
of the measures was limited. The evaluation of the program shows that “the 
covenant program mobilised additional financial means supporting branch-
level organization” (Veerman et al., 2007, p. 75). But the actual effectiveness 
of policies was limited. The covenants considered most successful were most 
easy to attain, whether because these branches already had strong branch-level 
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governance arrangements for health and safety issues or because the nature 
of health and safety problems in these branches was relatively simple 
(Veerman et al., 2007).
The covenants can be seen as a governance arrangement in which branch-
level cooperation in the field of health and safety measures is “bought” by the 
provision of financial means, whereas the national government refrained from 
involvement in policy making and implementation. The Ministry proved will-
ing to support decentralized policy autonomy and implementation discretion 
and finance the health and safety measures the branch level came up with. 
Responsibility as task was indeed supported by the governance constellation, 
but it did not lead to strong efforts for the implementation of the designed 
measures. The decentralized actors indeed proved willing to devise such 
plans, but the actual improvement of labor conditions in various branches 
appears limited or unclear at the least (Veerman et al., 2007).
We see responsibility as a task in which the central government provides 
resources to his subjects to attain objectives the central actor cannot attain 
himself. The state reluctantly requested the decentralized actor to help along 
with some of the issues that are beyond his own capacity. In response, the 
decentralized branch-level actors indeed claim the provided resources but do 
not fully come up to the central actor’s policy aims. This is an instance of the 
self-regulation paradox: Central deregulation was introduced to improve 
decentralized self-regulation. Instead, however, decentralized interests gained 
importance over the central policy aims of the government. Decentralized 
actors shifted the costs of the policy upward, to the central actor, while being 
able to autonomously decide how to use the provided resources. However, 
the central actor provides the claimed resources but proved unable to control 
the action of decentralized actors.
The Social Support Act
In 2007, the Social Support Act was introduced. The Act aims to promote the 
“participation” and “self-responsibility” of citizens in the public domain of 
municipalities. It seeks to promote social participation in terms of “strength-
ening social cohesion” and “self-reliance” through community care and civil 
volunteering (TK 30131, No. 3, 2005-2006). “Everyone participates” is a 
key slogan (Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sport, 2007, p. 4). The Act pre-
scribes that local governments include civil associations and active citizens, 
including community care workers and volunteers, in all stages of the policy 
process (Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sport, 2007). In the Act, nine so-called 
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“performance criteria” are defined, such as promoting social cohesion, promot-
ing community care, volunteering, supporting youth, supporting people with 
psychosocial problems, and supporting addicts. A minimum degree of care is 
legally specified: The so-called “compensation duty” to the most vulnerable 
citizens includes a limited number of public services, like the provision of 
wheel chairs (TK 30131, No. 41, 2005-2006). Apart from that, local govern-
ments are authorized to administer the Act according to local demands. Local 
governments are no longer accountable to the national government but are 
accountable to their local “governance partners.” The local council, not the 
central state, is the institution that evaluates whether the policy implementa-
tion process conforms to the performance indicators of the Act, given specific 
local social and political circumstances.
Rather than regulating conduct and funds, the Social Support Act localizes 
substantial policy making and the financial risks of policy failure and success. 
As such, it supports subsidiary responsibility as virtue. The Act has no sub-
stantial objective. It does not define solutions to the social problems of specific 
target groups. Instead, its objective is to reorganize administrative relation-
ships and to redistribute governmental responsibilities. The Act is an instru-
ment for organizing a local governance constellation, in which a wide variety 
of local governance actors participate, to activate associations and citizens in 
the public domain of the municipal community. Local governments are finan-
cially responsible for the implementation of the Act. The central government 
distributes public funds among the local governments according to a number of 
social indicators. These budgets are part of the general municipal fund. Local 
governments can no longer claim public refunds for specific policy efforts or 
target groups. The Act abolishes financial support for interest groups that are 
organized around a specific identity. These costs are now also covered from 
the municipal budget. About 40% of the entire municipal budget is reserved 
for implementing the Social Support Act.
As an actual social consequence, intimately experienced by the former 
target groups, the Social Support Act, though it provides local governments 
with the compensation duty, makes the local provision of public services 
largely dependent on local governance processes and local council decisions. 
The Act demonopolizes the policy making of civil servants to make space for 
including a wide variety of (nongovernmental) governance actors. In reality, 
it appears that local governments tend to include only a limited amount of 
cooperative associations in the policy process. Local governments typically 
expect from local target group associations that they come to engage with all 
sorts of associations, as only the broader network stands a chance for being 
included as governance actor. Hence, local (or regional) elderly unions, patient 
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organizations, volunteering groups, and migrant associations have typically 
come to join efforts to present themselves collectively—as a broad network 
that supports social participation and civic participation—to local govern-
ments. Local governments, bearing the resource risks of the policy, redefine 
their role and use local networks as efficient “civil service providers,” granting 
them a task with respect to local government policy objectives (SGBO, 
2006). A similar constellation emerges at the individual level. The Act pre-
scribes that professional care is only to be financed if families, neighbors, 
friends, volunteers, or social networks fail in their social support tasks of 
delivering their services to the needy. Therefore, the Act invests citizens with 
social support tasks and accountability requirements, such as financial resources 
and support from governance partners to provide social services that the 
municipal government used to provide. In this sense, local governments act 
as sovereigns, applying the self-government of local governance actors as a 
means for realizing municipal policy aims.
Notwithstanding these limitations, the objective of social participation is 
adequately addressed at the local level. Local opportunities to exercise virtue 
in self-government that did not exist under previous legislation are indeed 
opened. Citizens are now being invited by their local governments to reflect, 
in publicly organized sessions, on how to reorganize public spaces or make 
their neighborhoods cleaner and safer. The transfer of both the policy-making 
autonomy and implementation discretion on one hand and the financial risks 
on the other hand, indeed, seems to support responsibility as virtue. It is an 
alternative to direct regulation, to decentralized involvement in central pol-
icy making (as in the health and safety covenants; evoking a self-regulation 
paradox) and the imposition of incentives (as in the WWB; evoking a per-
formance paradox).
However, the danger of the transfer of central-level conflict to the decen-
tralized level appears not to be precluded. Localized governments operate as 
sovereigns transferring the responsibilities of incomplete decentralization 
on local subjects, who, however, now lack the protection of the central state. 
This implies that, for example, financial issues now affect the actual social 
support that is provided at the local level: while—at the national level—
individual citizens’ needs would remain to be protected in the context of 
legal “entitlements,” the limited availability of “provisions” (Dahrendorf, 
1988) at the local level stands in the way of granting these entitlements. The 
Act accordingly not only functions as a framework that shapes local respon-
sibility as virtue but also replaces central government conflict to the local 
level: the paradox of subsidiarity.
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Discussion and Conclusion
Previously, we outlined how three decentralized modes of governance can be 
distinguished conceptually and what types of administrative responsibility 
constellations these modes support. Moreover, we presented the possible 
paradoxical effects of such constellations. Governments may either decen-
tralize the resource (financial) risks of policy failure and success, supporting 
decentralized responsibility as accountability but possibly leading to a perfor-
mance paradox; or policy-making autonomy and implementation discretion, 
supporting decentralized task responsibility but possibly leading to a paradox 
of self-regulation; or both, supporting decentralized virtue but possibly lead-
ing to a subsidiarity paradox, transferring central-level conflict to the decen-
tralized level.
Clarke and Newman (1997) argued that the restructuring of the state has 
fundamentally altered the balance of power between the public and private 
realms, leading to the “dispersal of state power across a range of locales and 
sites” (p. 126). The “collectivist” version of the public was disempowered 
and public service values, institutionally embedded in the centralized organi-
zational regime, lost their support (Clarke & Newman, 1997, p. 127). However, 
Durant (2000) argued that this dispersal of state power implied the establish-
ment of a neoadministrative state. However, we stretched beyond this some-
what because we aimed at showing that the specific governance constellation 
resulting from differentiated decentralization processes supported differenti-
ated types of administrative responsibility leading to specific paradoxes of 
decentralization. Not only the extent of power but also the content of power 
differs between types of decentralization processes.
We studied three cases of decentralization in the Dutch welfare state, each 
representing one of these modes of decentralization. We illustrated how the 
possible paradoxical effects were evoked in the studied cases. This is outlined 
in Figure 2. After summarizing the Dutch findings, we present a brief com-
parison to decentralization operations in other contexts.
The WWB decentralized the financial risks of policy failure and success, 
without decentralizing policy-making autonomy and implementation discre-
tion. This supported responsibility as accountability, but a performance para-
dox was evoked. The incentives implied in the governance constellation 
forced local government to concentrate efforts on the immediate reintegration 
of welfare beneficiaries. This precluded an orientation of local government 
to complex local conditions, like the reintegration into labor of target groups 
with a greater distance to labor. As a result, the social integration of these citi-
zens is precarious. A neoadministrative state (Durant, 2000) is supported, in 
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which centralized sovereignty, although with lacking capacity, is essentially 
left intact (compare Robinson, 2008).
In the case of the health and safety covenants, policy-making autonomy 
and implementation discretion were decentralized, without decentralization 
of the financial risk of policy failure and success. This decentralization mode 
supported responsibility as task but evoked a self-regulation paradox. The 
central government provided the necessary means supporting health and 
safety policies to decentralized, branch-level actors, trusting that self-regulation 
would stimulate these actors to apply the provided means to generate relevant 
information and contribute to social problem solution. Sovereignty leaks away 
to decentralized governance partners that appear unwilling or unable to actu-
ally implement the measures and are oriented primarily to their own direct 
interests.
The complete decentralization (decentralization of both policy resources 
and content) of the Social Support Act supports responsibility as virtue. The 
Social Support Act functions to localize social problems and administrative 
challenges. A subsidiary state is supported in which social problems are trans-
formed into an issue for local governance. However, the localized governance 












































Figure 2. Three shifts of governance in the Dutch welfare state
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It cannot address issues like ageing, addiction, and migration that cut through 
localities or have a broader, national scope. The lack of available resources at 
the local level led local governments to withdraw from a virtuously respon-
sible governance of the issue of social care and act as a localized sovereign, 
reproducing national policy conflicts at the decentralized level. Local gov-
ernment’s policy objectives are strongly inspired by national-level finan-
cial issues, and local subjects now lack the protection of the legal regulation 
provided by the central state. Therefore, the subsidiary nature of the Social 
Support Act does not lead to the resolution of central-level conflict at the 
decentralized level but instead implies the disappearance of barriers against the 
transfer of conflict to the local constellation itself: a subsidiarity paradox. This 
subsidiarity paradox leads, in Robinson’s (2008) terms, not to the applica-
tion of an “influence-network” model but instead to the reinforcement of a 
“command-hierarchy” approach and to the building of a “neoadministrative 
state” (Durant, 2000).
Whether this pattern holds in the longer term is as yet unclear. Policy 
research of the case of the Dutch WWB revealed, for example, that policy 
instruments have further evolved and currently include discursive arrange-
ments aimed at the support of local decision-making capacities (Bannink, 
Bosselaar, & Trommel, 2011). This might lead support learning at the local 
level, enabling municipalities to effectively implement localized policies in 
spite of the performance paradox pressure resulting from the decentralization 
of policy resources. An interesting issue for future research concerns the inter-
action of such local learning and the impact of the performance paradox: How 
and to what extent are actors at the local level able to escape from the pressure 
of performance paradox? Analyses of shifts in governance then explicitly 
need to address the local “politics of policy implementation” (Nakamura & 
Smallwood, 1980), including the way local management operates across levels 
of governance supporting or blocking the emergence of “collaborative public 
management” (Agranoff & McGuire, 2003).
Are similar patterns observed in other welfare states? Our primary research 
concerned the Dutch welfare state. The Dutch welfare state has a tradition of 
highly institutionalized relations between a historically weak central state and 
strong civil society organizations. Tripartite involvement in policy formation 
and implementation strongly developed a defining element of the Dutch 
“Polder model” (Visser & Hemerijck, 1997). To be anyhow capable of policy 
formation and implementation, the Dutch central government apparently 
needs to accept the paradoxes of decentralization. Perhaps these paradoxical 
effects can be seen as the bail that a weak central government, which is 
dependent on the support and consent by societal actors, has to pay. We now 
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briefly discuss secondary sources on two other welfare states that strongly 
differ with respect to this tradition: the United States and France.
Robert Bellah, Madsen, Sullivan, Swidler, and Tipton (1992) pointed out 
that American federalism represents the subsidiarity principle. The American 
state is built up from below, from local self-government through grassroots 
political participation and civic voluntarism. Hence, the American state is 
under threat when civic engagement declines (see Skocpol, 1997). Pollitt and 
Bouckaert (2004) gave an overview of NPM style reforms from the 1980s 
onwards, including decentralization operations in 12 countries, among which 
are France and the United States. In the United States, a strong shift toward 
decentralized responsibility as accountability took place, where autonomous 
decentralized agencies have become responsible for the implementation 
of various policies and performance budgeting gained ground (Pollitt & 
Bouckaert, 2004). However, the actual performance of these agencies appears 
difficult to evaluate (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2004). Indications exist that the 
often politically appointed management pursued performance that would primar-
ily support their political position. As a result, the structure of U.S. government 
creates a “disconnection” between budget functions (supporting responsibility 
as accountability) and the control of “crosscutting issues and the government 
as a whole.” This disconnect indicates a performance paradox.
However, the French state manifests an “obsession with sovereignty” 
(Meunier, 2000, p. 3). French citizens do not rely on their own civic efforts 
but address a highly centralized, bureaucratic state power for support (Ziller, 
2003). Globalization and localization threaten the French state because it 
forces the sovereign to give more responsibilities to citizens and private 
actors. Assessing public management reforms in France, it appears that the 
“obsession with sovereignty” has not ended, especially when French reforms 
are compared with the reforms implemented in the United States. In France, 
deconcentration of the administrative structure took place (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 
2004). Autonomy at the decentralized level grew somewhat with respect to 
budget management and administrative decision making, denoting decentral-
ized responsibility as task as well as accountability. However, this largely left 
untouched the centralized mode of governance in the country: “Much of the 
machinery of a centralised civil service remains unaltered” (Pollitt & 
Bouckaert, 2004, p. 250). The analyses briefly discussed here lead us to 
reluctantly consider that the French civil service is less experienced with 
respect to issues of responsiveness. This suggests not so much the occurrence 
of one of the paradoxes of decentralization that we constructed but instead 
indicates an unintended effect of centralized government: lacking information 
of and responsiveness to local conditions.
24  Administration & Society XX(X)
Without pretending completeness in any way, the Dutch case studies and 
the limited comparison to U.S. and French decentralization operations sug-
gest that specific modes of decentralization (be it a strongly subsidiary mode, 
or any of the two incomplete modes of decentralization, as well as centralized 
modes of governance) each have their own, specific outcomes. Fully, centrally 
located capacity seems to produce an unambiguous responsibility constella-
tion but leads to lack in responsiveness of government to local conditions. 
Decentralized responsibility as task may lead to increased information and 
commitment from the decentralized level of a governance constellation but 
may engender a self-regulation paradox. Decentralized actors primarily 
address local issues while downplaying central-level concerns. Decentralized 
responsibility as accountability may lead to an increased emphasis on the 
performance of the decentralized actors of a governance system but may 
engender a performance paradox. Decentralized actors concentrate on rewarded 
performance while downplaying the overall aims of the policy. Decentralized 
responsibility as virtue creates a subsidiary governance relation that may lead to 
decentralized actors being strongly responsive to local social conditions and 
available policy resources, but it may result in the replacement of central-level 
conflict to the decentralized level.
This observation suggests another road for future research. When both cen-
tralized and variants of decentralized governance have their own weaker and 
stronger points, then what are the underlying mechanisms of governance 
reform? In other words, what are the broader implications of Clarke and 
Newman’s (1997) “dispersal of state power across a range of locales and 
sites” (p. 126)? Pressured by what conditions are the weaker elements of one 
of the governance arrangements traded against another? Why would societies 
come to prefer performance paradox to lacking responsiveness? We presume 
that such governance changes occur in the context of broader social changes 
of collectivization and decollectivization that might be understood with refer-
ence to work on collective action by Olson (1971) and Ostrom (1990) or De 
Swaan’s (1988) analysis of welfare state development as an instance of pri-
vate care collectivization in response to collective action dilemmas.
Be that as it may, in the current social context, we cannot point out the “best” 
way of decentralizing responsibilities. Instead, we identified the conse-
quences the different modes of decentralization entail. Different responsibility 
types are supported by different decentralization modes. A choice for either 
one of them cannot simply be made. Incomplete decentralization supports the 
masked sovereignty of the neoadministrative state. It transfers accountability 
or task without enabling decentralized actors to fully come up to the require-
ments of responsibility. This leads to an ambiguous governance constellation 
in which responsibilities are unclear. Such constellations appear as attempts 
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by central government to simply transfer political pressures of responsiveness 
and effectiveness to decentralized levels of government, although it is still 
unlikely that local conditions are indeed sufficiently addressed. However, this 
does not imply that a completely decentralized subsidiary governance constel-
lation would be a fully feasible alternative. Partial interdependencies between 
centralized and decentralized levels, we argue, are real and they entail ambigu-
ous requirements to be made of governance arrangements. A dilemma is 
implied that cannot easily be overcome. Complete decentralization may indeed 
support decentralized responsibility as virtue but appears inadequate because 
it does not acknowledge the interdependent nature of local and supralocal 
conditions. It results in the transfer of central-level conflict to the decentral-
ized level of governance: the subsidiarity paradox. However, incomplete 
decentralization does respond to the interdependencies between central and 
decentralized levels of governance but supports responsibility types that are 
associated with two other decentralization paradoxes. In other words, the 
interdependencies between central and decentralized levels of governance 
require internally inconsistent governance arrangements.
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